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This paper investigates the role of governance, in particular bribes to tax officials, in shaping business tax 
compliance behavior in transition economies. The empirical results show that business noncompliance 
rises with the frequency of tax related bribes. More specifically, the findings from 27 economies suggest 
that tax evasion thrives when bribes to tax officials are commonplace. These findings are robust to a 
number of specifications that control for firm and country attributes as well as address the potential 
endogeneity of bribes. 
JEL Classification: H25, H26, H32, D73 
Keywords: Tax Evasion, Firm Behavior, Corruption 
1.  Introduction 
Business tax compliance is critical to the fiscal viability of governments. This is 
particularly true because the bulk of the government's tax revenues, including taxes on 
profits, VAT and sales taxes, income tax withholding, and employment taxes are 
collected or paid by business (Joulfaian, 2000). Yet despite its importance, little is known 
about business tax compliance and the behavioral consequences of the various tax 
regimes (Cowell 2004). Indeed, the empirical literature on business tax evasion is scant, 
in sharp contrast to the voluminous work on individual income tax compliance 
(Clotfelter 1983; Cowell, 1990; Slemrod, 1992). 
Tax administration, in particular as it relates to the penalty and detection 
regimes, figures prominently in determining the level and character of tax evasion 
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Yet governance may compromise the efficacy of such 
tax regimes. For example, some of the transition economies of Europe and the former 
Soviet Union may be characterized as regimes with stiff if not draconian penalties for 
engaging in tax evasion. But these states are also plagued with serious governance 
shortcomings, with tax penalties that apply at the discretion of tax officials.
3 This raises 
the question of whether corruption, and in particular bribes to tax officials, reduces tax 
compliance as it compromises the statutory detection and penalty regimes. 
This paper explores how bribes to tax officials shape business tax evasion in 
transition economies. The results suggest that governance, particularly as it relates to tax 
administration, is an important determinant of business tax compliance behavior. Basic 
sample statistics show that noncompliance is much higher when firms perceive bribes to 
be widespread than when they are believed never to take place. This is further 
confirmed using multivariate analysis which shows tax evasion to increase with the 
frequency of tax related bribes. In addition, the findings suggest that the estimated 
effects of bribes are likely to be larger when their potential endogeneity is controlled for. 
The analysis controls for the form of organizational choice and nature of the largest 
                                                 
1 The paper benefitted from comments by John Anderson, the editor, and two anonymous referees. The 
views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of the 
Treasury. 
2 US Department of the Treasury 
3 See Himes and Milliet-Einbinder (1999) for the experience in Russia. 228 
 




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
shareholder. It also accounts for the effects of tax rates, firm size, industrial 
classification, and country effects. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
review of the literature on business tax evasion. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical 
framework to motivate the empirical modeling of business evasion, and provides a 
description of the data on 27 economies. These countries cover central and eastern 
Europe, and the former Soviet Union. Empirical results are reported in Section 4, which 
also explores the endogeneity of bribes to evasion. Concluding comments are provided 
in section 5. 
2.  Literature Review 
A large body of the literature has addressed the determinants of personal income 
tax evasion since the seminal work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). However, and in 
contrast to the numerous studies of personal income tax evasion, only a few studies 
have addressed business tax evasion. Some of the theoretical aspects of business tax 
evasion have been addressed. Marrelli (1984), for instance, compares tax evasion under a 
value-added tax to that under a profit tax, and finds that evasion patterns depend on risk 
aversion assumptions. Marrelli and Martina (1988) analyze tax evasion in the context of 
an oligopolistic market, while Kreutzer and Lee (1986 and 1988) and Wang and Conant 
(1988) analyze the effects of opportunities to evade taxes on the optimal output of a 
monopolist. Cremer and Gahvari (1993) and Virmani (1989) focus on competitive 
industry. Cowell (2004) provides an extensive review of this literature. 
Expanding on the scope of studies on business tax evasion, Chen and Chu 
(2005) focus on the separation of ownership and control, and how this results in 
efficiency loss. And, more recently, Crocker and Slemrod (2005) examine corporate tax 
evasion with agency costs, and conclude that penalties imposed on manager rather than 
shareholders are more effective in reducing evasion. 
Unfortunately, there has been a more limited set of empirical studies on the 
topic. Rice (1992), for instance, uses the 1981 TCMP data on small corporations in the 
US to study the determinants of corporate income tax evasion.
4 His findings show that 
although corporate tax compliance is negatively associated with tax rates, the effects are 
rather small. Interestingly, Rice also finds a positive association between compliance and 
disclosure requirements of the sort faced by publicly traded corporations. 
Joulfaian (2000) empirically gauges the effects of managerial preferences for tax 
evasion, as proxied by their noncompliance with the personal income tax, on corporate 
compliance behavior. Using the 1987 TCMP data, the findings suggest that corporate 
tax evasion critically depends on managerial preferences. They also suggest that taxes 
have a positive, albeit small, effect on under reporting of profits.
5  
Others have explored the implications of corruption. Johnson et al (2000), for 
instance, examine the impact of government corruption on hidden output by comparing 
data on Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and the Ukraine. They show that corruption 
                                                 
4 The Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) data represents a sample of some 18,000 
relatively small corporations randomly selected for extensive audit by the Internal Revenue Service. 
5 Other empirical studies focused exclusively on the effect of taxes on tax evasion by proprietors. 
Clotfelter (1983), for instance, addresses noncompliance by proprietors, while Joulfaian and Rider 
(1998) examine the compliance behavior of proprietors and landlords.  
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has adverse effects on reported output.
6 Otherwise, the empirical literature on business 
tax evasion is quite thin, indeed. 
3.  Modeling Business Tax Evasion 
3.1 Theoretical  Framework 
To motivate the paper, consider a simple framework where a firm is owned by a 
risk-neutral shareholder. If at the end of the fiscal year the firm reports the correct 
profits to tax authorities, then the after tax income is simply y(1-τ), where y is pre-tax 
profits, defined as sales or revenues (r) less costs (c), and τ is the tax rate. If the firm 
engages in tax evasion, however, the expected profit will also depend on the probability 
of detection and penalty rate.
7 
More specifically, the firm, with some re-arranging, maximizes expected profits: 
 
(3.1)  τ γ τ τ er e p er c r p e y E ) ( ) 1 )( ( ) , , ( − + − − = Π  
 
where  Π is profits, e the fraction of sales or output not reported, p the 
probability of detection, such that pe>0, and pee>0, and γ>1 is the penalty rate. This 
assumes that tax evasion primarily takes the form of concealing sales, and not inflating 
deductible expenses (Yaniv, 1996).
8 The first order condition is: 
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and the familiar ∂e/∂γ<0 and ∂e/∂p<0 (Clotfelter, 1983). Evasion is expected to 
decline with detection and penalty rates. 
Next, modify the tax regime by introducing bribes to tax officials. For simplicity 
assume that bribes are an exogenously determined fixed cost to the firm, and that they 
may influence the penalty regime for detected evasion. With bribes in the picture, the 
expected profit in (3.1) may be re-written as: 
 
(3.1’)  ] ) ( )[ ( ) 1 )( ( b er b e p er c r + − + − − τ γ τ τ  
 
                                                 
6 Hindriks, Keen, Muthoo (1999) explore the implications of corruption for the effects and optimal 
design of tax collection schemes, while Anderson (2005, 2006) examines the determinants of bribes to 
tax officials. Gorodnichenkoa and Sabirianova-Peter (2007) address the effects of bribes on individual 
evasion. 
7 This ignores the trade-off between evasion and avoidance, as well as the possibility that tax departments 
may be treated as money makings centers throughout the year which may very well influence pre-tax 
earnings y. See Desai (2005) for a general discussion. 
8 This can be further modified by assuming costs to be a constant fraction of sales. See Cowell (2004). 230 
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such that γb<0; the larger the bribe the smaller the penalty rate (note that γ>1). 
The optimum evasion in (3.3) becomes: 
 
(3.3’) 














where ∂e/∂b is ambiguous and depends on the size of the bribe and its influence 
on the penalty regime. 
The bribes regime may also be altered so that the size of the bribe is directly 
related to the firm's noncompliance, b(e), and possibly the penalty regime as well, b(e,γ), 
further adding to the above ambiguity. This simple framework can be expanded to 
incorporate a Nash Equilibrium of the game between an entrepreneur and an 
imperfectly monitored tax official where the businessman pays the bribe and the official 
accepts it for not revealing the “dishonest” behavior and levying a penalty (Bilotkach, 
2006). But ultimately, the sign, as well as the magnitude, of the effect of bribes to the 
taxman remains an empirical question. Indeed, even under the most basic assumption as 
in (3.1’), the impact of bribes is ambiguous. 
The empirical challenge is to locate appropriate data where noncompliance and 
the various features of tax regimes are observed. The next section provides a description 
of such available data and construction of the variables used to model business evasion. 
3.2  Data Sources and Construction of Variables 
Data on business noncompliance are obtained from a sample of firms in the 26 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, as 
well as Turkey. This data, obtained from the 2002 EBRD-World Bank Business 
Environment and Enterprise Survey (BEEPS) II, consists of 6,667 business entities 
stratified by country, size, and type of ownership.
9 
The BEEPS survey provides extensive information on the profile of surveyed 
businesses as well as governance related conditions in which these firms operate. The 
two critical variables of interest in the BEEPS data are the fraction of sales concealed 
from tax authorities (e) and the frequency of “unofficial gifts” or bribes for tax 
purposes, a proxy for b in (3.3'). 
A number of observations from the sample of 6,667 observations are excluded. 
For instance, I exclude 927 public enterprises so as to focus on the private sector. As 
shown in Table 1, the resulting sample consists of 5,740 businesses, of which 1,766 are 
sole proprietorships, followed by 1,517 partnerships, and 1,508 corporations of which 
161 are listed on an exchange. The majority of these entities are in the trade (34 percent) 
and manufacturing (25 percent) sectors. About 2300 firms reported total sales of under 
$250,000, and 25 reported sales over $50 million. 
The following is a brief description of the key variables of interest in this paper, 
and their construction: 
                                                 
9 For a description and access to BEEPS visit  
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/beeps.htm. This data has been used extensively 
to model the effects of corruption and other aspects of firm behavior in transition economies. See 
Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, and Schankerman (2000) and Anderson (2005, 2006) for two of many 
examples. A similar dataset for Uganda was employed in Svensson (2003).  
 




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
231
Evasion: Noncompliance is measured as the fraction of sales concealed. In 
particular the survey questionnaire asks firm representatives to respond the following 
question: 
Q58. “… what per cent of total annual sales would you estimate the typical firm 
in your area of business reports for tax purposes?” 
The survey poses a non-self-incriminating question on such a delicate issue to 
elicit the desired information. Obviously a firm observes its own evasion level, and is 
unlikely to have any direct information on the compliance level of other firms in its line 
of business. As such the response to the questionnaire is likely to be informed by its 
own compliance level. Nevertheless, the reported evasion may very well be measured 
with error. Consequently, it is very important to control for firm attributes such as 
industry, size, organizational form, among others. 
Of the 5,740 observations, 643 (11 percent) respondents failed to answer this 
question. One estimation option is to exclude observations with missing responses. 
However, if the nonresponse is endogenous to governance and other variables related 
to firm behavior, then their exclusion may bias estimates. Instead, these observations are 
retained and used later to test for potential bias resulting from not controlling for 
missing values. The conditional average fraction of sales concealed in the sample is 17.7 
percent (sd=24.7). 
The Tax Regime: Comprehensive data on actual audit and detection rates do not 
exist. Statutory penalty rates vary from one country to another, and there is no easy way 
of summarizing and comparing these penalty regimes. Some of these penalties seem to 
apply at the discretion of tax officials (Himes and Milliet-Einbinder, 1999). Indeed, the 
conduct of the latter may have much bearing on the efficacy of the detection and 
penalty regimes. If they are more likely to demand or accept gifts and kickbacks, and 
share the fruits of tax evasion, then they may very well exacerbate the problem of 
noncompliance. 
The following question is asked in the BEEPS questionnaire: 
Q56g: “Thinking now of unofficial payments/gifts that a firm like yours would 
make in a given year, could you please tell me how often would they make 
payments/gifts for the following purposes … To deal with taxes and tax collection.” 
Seven possible answers are reported in the data: (1) never, (2) seldom, (3) 
sometimes, (4) frequently, (5) usually, (6) always, and (7) missing. The distribution of 
these responses is provided in Table 1 which shows 2,760 observations with zero gifts, 
834 where gifts seldom take place, and as few as 150 where gifts always take place; 401 
firms refused to respond. 
In addition to tax administration, marginal tax rates potentially play an important 
role in influencing taxpayer behavior. The marginal tax rate is defined as the maximum 
statutory profit or corporate tax rate for each country. Conceptually, the effects of such 
tax rates could be absorbed by country specific effects (dummies) in a cross sectional 
data, which preempt their use. Fortunately, the survey provides indicators of the profit 
margin, i.e., the ratio of profits to sales. Hence, the statutory tax rates are set to zero 
when the firm is not profitable.
10 With a zero tax rate there should not be tax motivated 
concealments. The sample average tax rate is about 24 percent (sd=0.10). 
Ownership and Control: Indicators of organizational choice (question S2a), 
summarized earlier in Table 1, are employed to account for the degree of control 
                                                 
10 Statutory tax rates are obtained from the IBFD European Tax Handbook, PriceWaterHouse 
Corporate Taxes – Worldwide Summaries, and various online sources. 232 
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owners have over the firm’s operations. As an alternative, the nature of the largest 
shareholders (question Q4a) is also considered. As shown in Table 1, a majority of the 
firms (3,812) report individuals and family as their largest shareholders. Another 1,154 
firms report corporate shareholders, of which 700 are foreign corporations. 
Other: Other variables include industrial classification, measured as a fraction of 
output, total sales for size, which is available as a categorical variable. Country fixed 
effects is employed to control for cross country differences in tax administration and 
governance (institutions), culture, and tax morale (Alm and Togler, 2006), as well as 
unobservable attributes. 
4.  Empirical Results 
4.1 Basic  Statistics 
Table 2 examines the pattern of evasion by the frequency of gifts. On average, 
noncompliance rises with the reported frequency of such “bribes.” The mean fraction 
of sales concealed is 12 percent (sd=21) where bribes are reported to never take place. 
This rises with the frequency of such bribes up to 31 percent (sd=28) when they are 
reported to “always” take place. Note, however, that the fraction evaded is 18 percent 
(sd=28) when the indicator for bribes is missing.  
Table 3 summarizes the trend in noncompliance by form of organizational 
choice. For proprietors, the mean concealment rate is 21 percent (sd=26). There is a 
slight decrease for cooperatives, followed by partnerships and unlisted corporations 
where the rate is 14 percent (sd=23). For corporations listed on an exchange, the rate 
drops to an average of 9 percent (sd=20) a pattern consistent with that in Rice (1982).  
Table 4 explores the pattern of evasion by the nature of the largest shareholders 
of the firm. Sales are under reported by 19 percent (sd=25) when an individual/family 
represents the largest shareholder. Similarly, firms with managers representing the 
largest shareholders report an understatement of 20 percent (sd=25). This fraction 
declines to 16 percent (sd=24) for firms with domestic corporate shareholders. For 
firms with foreign corporations as the largest shareholders, the mean rate is only 11 
percent (sd=20), a pattern consistent with that in Joulfaian (2000). In general, it seems 
organizational choice has significant implications for tax evasion. 
The reported evasion also varies by country, as shown in Table 5 for the 27 
countries. This highlights the importance of controlling for country specific effects. In 
particular, the Balkan countries exhibit large gaps in reporting. The year 2001 was 
particularly a difficult period coming shortly after the wars of the late 1990s. 
The statistics reported in Tables 2 through 4 suggest that noncompliance is likely 
to be greatest in the presence of corrupt tax officials, which may be partly checked by 
the separation of ownership and control. To shed further light on this relationship and 
to control for other firm attributes, multivariate analysis estimates are provided below. 
4.2 Multivariate  Analysis 
Tax evasion by its very nature is censored, as not all businesses report or engage 
in tax evasion. Conceptually, we are interested in modeling the gap in reported sales, e, a 
latent variable, as: 
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where  x is a set of exogenous variables. However, the presence of missing 
responses complicates the modeling of compliance, as e is observed only when the firm 
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with v independent variables. Hence, not controlling for missing values may bias 
estimates of e in (4.1). However, this should not be a concern if cov(ε,u)=0. 
Given the available data, the empirical strategy is to model the participation 
decision, i.e. the absence of missing values for e, using Probit. Conditional on a positive 
response, the amount evaded is estimated using a Tobit equation for the fraction under 
reported. The estimates for this sample selection model are in the spirit of Heckman 
(1979) extended to the Tobit model setting using FIML (Greene, 1997, pp. 624). 
I first begin with the effects of gifts only, and report the results in the left panel 
of Table 6.
11 The Probit or participation equation is reported in the first column, and the 
Tobit or evasion level equation in the second column. The Probit equation contains two 
additional variables or indicators that reflect a degree of openness, comfort with 
preparing and sharing financial reports, among others, which may influence the 
response rate but not necessarily the outcome. These are the title or position of the 
interviewee and a flag for if a firm has engaged outside financial expertise in reviewing 
its books (questions Q1 and Q74). The former includes (1) president/Chief Executive 
Officer/Vice President, (2) Owner/proprietor, (3) Partner, (4) Director, (5) General 
Manager, (6) Manager, (7) and Finance Officer.
12 
The Probit estimates of participation show that the probability of responding to 
the evasion question rises with the frequency of bribes. In contrast, it is lowest for those 
who fail to respond to the question related to bribes. Also, firms that engage an outside 
auditor also seem more likely to respond to the questionnaire. However, the coefficients 
on the title or position of the interviewee are note precisely measured. 
Conditional on responding to the evasion question, the Tobit estimates show 
that the gap rises with the frequency of bribes. For those who report gifts seldom to 
take place, the estimated coefficient is positive with a value of 0.22 (se=0.02). This 
suggests that concealments are 11 percentage points higher compared to the state of 
gifts never taking place; Φ(z)=0.5. This coefficient rises to 0.38 (se=0.04), suggesting 
                                                 
11 I exclude all 7 firms that have banks as their largest shareholders to aid in the estimation (convergence) 
below. It is not possible to estimate the generalized Tobit equations (two step criterion and level 
equations) with industry dummies in the presence of these of observations (no missing values for 
evasion in case of banks). Including these observations in a standard Tobit, which ignores 
nonresponses, has no material effect on the findings reported below. 
12 The frequency of these positions are 916, 1583, 328, 1155, 435, 487, and 829, respectively.  234 
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that the fraction concealed increases by 19 percentage points when gifts are reported to 
take place regularly.  
The value of σ suggests that the Tobit model is appropriate, given the censored 
nature of reported evasion. Similarly, the estimated correlation (ρ) between the residuals, 
ε and u, in (4.1) and (4.2) is statistically significant, suggesting a need to control for 
missing values in the dependent variable. 
The second panel of Table 6 augments these estimates with the organizational 
form of the firm, its tax rate, and other attributes (size, industry, country). There is little 
change in the estimated coefficients reported earlier for the participation equation, 
except that ρ is no longer significant. Also, organizational form and the tax rate seem to 
have little effect. Moving to the evasion equation, the estimated coefficients on gifts 
change little; the size of concealed sales continues to rise with the frequency of bribes. 
As for the coefficients on the organizational form of the firm, the estimates point to 
smaller tax evasion by corporations. This is particularly true for those listed on an 
exchange, when compared to proprietorships, consistent with the pattern observed in 
Table 2 and the findings in Rice (1992). The estimated coefficient is -0.04 (se=0.016) for 
partnerships, followed by an estimate of -0.05 (se=0.02) for closely held or private 
corporations. This estimate rises, in absolute value, to -0.15 (se=0.04) for the exchange 
listed corporations, and implies that the fraction evaded by these firms is 7 percentage 
points smaller than that of proprietorships. The tax rate enters with a positive sign, as 
implied in (3.3’), with an estimated coefficient of 0.32 (se=0.07). This suggests that the 
fraction of sales concealed rises by 1.6 percentage points for every 10 percentage point 
increase in tax rates.
13 
The third or right panel of Table 6 replaces the organizational choice with the 
underlying nature of the largest shareholders of the firm. Compared to individual/family 
owners, again less evasion is reported by corporate owners. The estimated coefficient 
for domestic corporations is -0.03 (se=0.02), which rises in absolute value to -0.11 
(se=0.02) for foreign corporations where the concealment fraction is eight percentage 
points lower. One possible interpretation of this outcome is that corporate governance 
is less of a problem in the case of foreign owned entities. Another interpretation may 
point to a greater separation between ownership and control. Regardless, the finding is 
in harmony with that in Joulfaian (2000) who finds that noncompliance is smaller for 
foreign owned corporations in the US. Noncompliance by employee owned firms is also 
smaller, with an estimated coefficient of -0.10 (se=0.03). 
4.3   Are Bribes Endogenous? 
The observed pattern of bribes to tax officials is potentially endogenous to 
evasion, and the estimated coefficients on gifts reported above may very well be biased. 
14 The challenge here is to find an instrument that captures institutionalized corruption 
or demand for bribes, controlling for taxpayer specific induced incentives. 
                                                 
13 Value added taxes were also considered (except for Bosnia and Yugoslavia) but discarded as they are 
highly collinear with country effects. 
14 For the sake of curiosity, I swapped the dependent variable and the gifts indicator and estimated an 
Ordered Probit equation. The estimated coefficient on evasion, now a right hand side variable, is 0.985 
(se=0.069), suggesting that bribes rise with evasion; it is difficult to establish the direction of causality 
between bribes and tax evasion. These estimates are available upon request.  
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The survey provides a potential candidate for such an instrument. Question 51 
of the survey inquires about the possibility of getting corrective treatment from another 
official or superiors when a government agent acts against the rules without resorting to 
bribes. More specifically, the survey asks: 
Q51: “How often is the following statement true? “If a government agent acts 
against the rules I can usually go to another official or to his superior and get the correct 
treatment without recourse to unofficial payments/gifts.” 
In addition to missing responses, there are six possible answers to this question: 
(1) never where the firm is unable to find a corrective remedy, (2) seldom, (3) 
sometimes, (4) frequently, (5) usually, and (6) always where other officials remedy 
transgressions without resorting to bribes. 
Table 7 provides the frequency distribution of the responses to question 51 of 
the survey, and how evasion varies with these responses. The figures show that 
noncompliance is greatest when bribes are the only way to get problems resolved 
(n=976). The fraction of sales concealed declines from a high of 20 percent down to 11 
percent when problems are corrected without resorting to bribes (n=349). 
The attractiveness of this indicator, sorted in reverse order, is that it is a broad 
measure of corruption, one that is less specific to tax administration and more likely to 
be exogenous to the size of tax evasion of a particular firm. However, given its 
qualitative nature, to instrument the gifts indicator, itself with values that range from 1 
(gifts never take place) to 6 (gifts always take place), including missing, is a difficult task.  
In order to replicate the earlier estimates of the determinants of evasion, but this 
time using an instrument for bribes, I first exclude all observations where missing values 
are reported for concealed sales and gifts. For the reduced sample of 4,802 firms, I 
reproduce the estimates reported in the center panel of Table 6 in order to explore any 
potential bias from these deletions. The estimated coefficients on the explanatory 
variables, reported in the first panel of Table 8, are almost identical to those reported 
earlier, which is very reassuring. As before, evasion rises with the frequency of gifts. 
Also evasion is smallest for listed corporations, and rises with tax rates. 
Using the reduced sample, I reproduce the above estimates but this time using a 
linear measure of gifts. In other words, rather than the reported 6 categories, now gifts 
enters as a continuous variable with values that range from one to 6. To derive an 
instrument for the linear measure of gifts, I first estimate an ordered probit equation for 
gifts which is regressed on the exogenous gifts measure of Table 7 and the remaining 
variables. The latter, however, exclude firm specific variables such as organizational 
form, tax rate, and size. The predicted probabilities for the six outcomes from the 
Ordered Probit are correlated with the gifts variable but in no way correlated with firm 
attributes and behavior. These predicted probabilities are employed as instruments in 
estimating Tobit IV. 
The middle and right panels of Table 8 report estimates that employ the linear 
measure of gifts, using both standard Tobit and Tobit IV. Beginning with the former, 
not surprisingly and consistent with the earlier estimates, evasion rises with bribes; the 
estimated coefficient is 0.07 (se=0.005). While the implications are qualitatively similar 
to those in the first panel, the quantitative effects are different; concealment increases 
monotonically by about 3.5 percentage, or 0.07*Φ(z), as the severity of bribes rises. The 
coefficients on the remaining variables are unaffected. 
Moving to the Tobit IV equation in the last panel of table 8 where predicted 
gifts are used as instruments, the estimated coefficient on gifts is now much larger. In 236 
 




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
contrast to the earlier estimate of 0.07 (se=0.005) in the middle panel, the new estimate 
is 0.27 (se=0.04). In other words, the fraction of output concealed increases by about 13 
percentage points as the severity of bribes rises from one category to another, other 
things equal. The remaining variables are slightly affected, but for the most part retain 
their qualitative effects.
15 
In a perfect world, the amount or size of bribes to tax officials would have been 
the ideal measure to test for its endogeneity to tax evasion. Nevertheless, and 
notwithstanding the less than ideal data available, the above findings suggest that gifts to 
tax officials are potentially endogenous to noncompliance. Concealing business sales 
and the severity of bribes do seem to go hand in hand. While not controlling for this 
potential endogeneity has little effect on the qualitative findings, the effects on the level 
of noncompliance may very well be biased. 
 
5.  Conclusion: 
This paper investigates the determinants of business tax evasion with a special 
emphasis on the role of governance. It employs data from a sample of businesses in 26 
transition economies in Europe and the Former Soviet Union and Turkey.
16 The data 
provide information on the severity of bribes as well as firm and country attributes. 
The results suggest that governance, as measured by the frequency of tax related 
bribes, is a significant determinant of compliance behavior. Basic statistics show that, 
when compared to tax regimes with no bribes, noncompliance is larger under where 
bribes are common. Multivariate analyses further confirm these estimates and show that 
evasion rises with bribes to tax officials. The estimated effects, however, are much larger 
when the endogeneity of bribes is corrected for. The findings also suggest that 
organizational choices may have important implications for compliance. Corporations, 
particularly those listed on an exchange or of foreign nationality, conceal less of their 
activities than other forms of businesses. 
A potential limitation of this paper is its inability to address how particular 
institutions (e.g. rule of law) or variations in income (e.g. per capita income) affect 
compliance patterns in the various countries. The presence of country fixed effects 
preempts the undertaking of such a task. One is tempted to augment the data employed 
in this paper with surveys from additional years to tease out the changes in institutional 
settings. The 2005 BEEPS survey, for instance, represents one such opportunity. 
Unfortunately, this latest survey makes it rather difficult to control for tax rate effects as 
information on firm profitability is not captured. Because tax evasion is not a serious 
option for loss-making firms, the survey update is not very useful in addressing tax 
evasion and its determinants. 
                                                 
15 The organizational form was replaced with the nature of the largest shareholder, as in the right panel 
of Table 6. The findings on bribes remain invariant to this specification. These estimates are not 
reproduced here in the interest of space, but are available upon request. 
16 Excluding Turkey and limiting the sample to transition economies does not alter the findings.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Select of Variables 
Sample  Sample when Evasion 
 is Not Missing  Variable  
Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. 
Sales Evaded (%)  --  --  17.72  24.68 
Tax Rate (%)  23.67  9.84  23.78  9.39 
Mining (%)  0.78  8.15  0.81  8.30 
Construction (%)  11.64  30.66  11.78  30.80 
Manufacturing (%)  24.77 40.35 24.77  40.33 
Transportation (%)  6.29  23.32  6.27  23.26 
Trade (%)  34.02  44.37  34.37  44.47 
Business Services (%)  9.58  28.38  9.24  27.90 
Hotels and restaurants (%)  7.18  25.15  7.12  25.05 
Other (%)  5.76  21.67 5.63  21.47 
Observations 5,740    5,097   
Number of Observations by Gift Frequency       
 Never  2,763    2,445   
 Seldom  836    763   
 Sometimes  800    729   
 Frequently  498    455   
 Usually  252    236   
 Always  190    181   
 Not Reported  401    288   
Number of Observations by Organizational Form       
 Sole Proprietorship  1,981    1,766   
 Partnership  1,714    1,517   
 Cooperative  143    121   
 Corporation, privately held  1,524    1,347   
 Corporation, listed on an exchange  184    161   
 Other  194    185   
Number of Observations by Largest Shareholders       
 Individual/Family  3,812    3,374   
 Domestic corporation  453    405   
 Foreign Corporation  700    629   
 Banks  7    7   
 Investment fund  32    27   
 Managers  191    174   
 Employees  213    186   
 Government  25    22   
 Other  34    30   
 Mixed  134    122   
 Not Reported  139    121   
Number of Observations by Sales ($000s)       
  >  250    2,305    2,088   
250 >  500    564    522   
500  >  1,000    424    386   
1,000 >  2,000    332    303   
2,000  >  5,000    286    249   
5,000 >  10,000    127    108   
10,000  >  20,000    90    83   
20,000 >  50,000    52   48   
50,000    and over    25    22   
 Not Reported      1,535    1,288   240 
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Table 2. Fraction of Sales Concealed by Frequency of Bribes to Tax Officials 
 Variable  Mean Std.  Dev.  n 
1 Never  0.12  0.21  2,445 
2  Seldom  0.21  0.25  763 
3 Sometimes  0.21  0.24  729 
4  Frequently  0.28  0.27  455 
5 Usually  0.31  0.27  236 
6  Always  0.31  0.28  181 
7 Not  Reported  0.18  0.28  288 
   Total  0.18  0.25  5,097 
   Missing   --   --  643 
 
Table 3. Fraction of Sales Concealed by Organizational Form 
 Variable  Mean  Std.  Dev. n 
1 Sole  Proprietor  0.21  0.26  1766 
2  Partnership  0.18  0.25  1517 
3 Cooperative  0.15  0.24  121 
4  Corporation, privately held  0.14  0.23  1347 
5  Corporation, listed on an exchange  0.09  0.20  161 
6  Other  0.15  0.21  185 
   Total  0.18  0.25  5097 
   Missing   --   --  643 
 
Table 4. Fraction of Sales Concealed by Type of Largest Shareholders 
 Variable  Mean  Std.  Dev.  n 
1 Individual/Family  0.19 0.25  3,374 
2  Domestic corporation  0.16  0.24  405 
3 Foreign  corporation  0.11 0.20  629 
4  Banks  0.16  0.18  7 
5 Investment  fund  0.21 0.32  27 
6  Managers  0.20  0.25  174 
7 Employees  0.13 0.24  186 
8  Government  0.17  0.27  22 
9 Other  0.09 0.19  30 
10  Mixed  0.15  0.23  122 
11 Not  reported  0.22  0.28  121 
   Total  0.18  0.25  5,097 
   Missing   --   --  643 
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Table 5. Fraction of Sales Concealed and Tax Rates, by Country 




Tax Rate  N 
Albania  0.25  0.23  0.248 0.250 147 
Armenia   0.09  0.17  0.162  0.200  130 
Azerbaijan    0.15  0.25  0.229 0.270 127 
Belarus   0.10  0.18  0.231  0.240  202 
Bosnia  0.33  0.34  0.258 0.300 130 
Bulgaria   0.17  0.23  0.185  0.200  179 
Croatia    0.13  0.18  0.175 0.200 117 
Czech Republic  0.11  0.17  0.285  0.310  202 
Estonia    0.08  0.13  0.295 0.350 117 
Macedonia  0.37  0.30  0.138  0.150  158 
Georgia    0.39  0.28  0.174 0.200 144 
Hungary   0.12  0.20  0.167  0.180  204 
Kazakhstan    0.17  0.26  0.235 0.300 186 
Kyrgyzstan   0.26  0.29  0.245  0.300  118 
Latvia    0.14  0.22  0.202 0.250 132 
Lithuania   0.16  0.25  0.123  0.150  151 
Moldova    0.23  0.25  0.267 0.280 141 
Poland   0.11  0.18  0.234  0.280  399 
Romania    0.15  0.20  0.243 0.250 200 
Russia   0.19  0.25  0.305  0.350  368 
Slovakia    0.14  0.19  0.272 0.290 115 
Slovenia   0.19  0.29  0.208  0.250  137 
Tajikistan    0.29  0.30  0.291 0.300 126 
Turkey   0.17  0.21  0.316  0.330  432 
Ukraine    0.16  0.27  0.281 0.300 365 
Uzbekistan   0.10  0.21  0.243  0.260  210 
Yugoslavia    0.26  0.30  0.131 0.140 160 
 Total   0.18  0.25  0.237  0.264  5,097 
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Table 6. Determinants of Tax Evasiona (Probit Equation for Survey Response, Followed by a Tobit Equation for Evasion) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
   Participation Equation Evasion Equation  Participation Equation Evasion  Equation  Participation Equation Evasion Equation 
Variable Coefficient  s.e  Coefficient s.e Coefficient  s.e Coefficient s.e  Coefficient s.e  Coefficient  s.e 
Constant 1.1108*  0.0660  -0.1673*  0.0185 0.8548* 0.1426  0.0971  0.0549 0.8003* 0.1398  0.0869  0.0559 
Gifts  (Never  excluded)                      
 2. Seldom  0.1595*  0.0692  0.2235*  0.0196 0.1552*  0.0731  0.1844*  0.0178 0.1558*  0.0731  0.1829*  0.0179 
 3. Sometimes  0.1611*  0.0703  0.2342*  0.0209 0.1564* 0.0759  0.1832*  0.0189 0.1605* 0.0760  0.1813*  0.0191 
 4. Frequently  0.1690*  0.0863  0.3290*  0.0244 0.1229  0.0937  0.2441*  0.0221 0.1178  0.0938  0.2419*  0.0223 
 5. Usually  0.3333*  0.1278  0.3765*  0.0334 0.3111* 0.1369  0.2929*  0.0302 0.3199* 0.1373  0.2902*  0.0302 
 6. Always  0.4803*  0.1597  0.3771*  0.0371 0.4832*  0.1694  0.2777*  0.0349 0.4846*  0.1692  0.2797*  0.0351 
  7.  Missing  -0.6255* 0.0737  0.0563**  0.0290 -0.5461* 0.0794  0.0365 0.0338 -0.5475* 0.0794  0.0384 0.0342 
O r g a n i z a t i o n a l   F o r m                       
 2. Partnership   --   --   --  --  -0.1063  0.0674  -0.0418*  0.0158  --   --   --   -- 
 3. Cooperative   --   --   --  --  -0.1787  0.1477  -0.0035  0.0391  --   --   --   -- 
 4. Private corporation   --   --   --  --  -0.0564  0.0751  -0.0483*  0.0172  --   --   --   -- 
 5. Listed corporation   --   --   --  --  0.0430  0.1459  -0.1452*  0.0382  --   --   --   -- 
 6. Other   --   --   --  --  0.0974  0.1902  -0.0667**  0.0373  --   --   --   -- 
Largest  Shareholders                      
 2. Domestic corporation   --   --   --  --   --   --   --   --  0.0549  0.0924  -0.0293  0.0219 
 3. Foreign corporation   --   --   --  --   --   --   --   --  0.0517  0.0800  -0.1072*  0.0196 
 5. Investment fund   --   --   --  --   --   --   --   --  0.0694  0.2876  -0.0059  0.0616 
 6. Managers   --   --   --  --   --   --   --   --  0.0268  0.1438  0.0256  0.0327 
 7. Employees   --   --   --  --   --   --   --   --  -0.0853  0.1214  -0.0955*  0.0306 
 8. Government   --   --   --  --   --   --   --   --  -0.0263  0.3488  -0.0785  0.0724 
 9. Other   --   --   --  --   --   --   --   --  -0.0554  0.3028  -0.1251  0.0794 
 10. Mixed   --   --   --  --   --   --   --   --  0.1886  0.1631  -0.0741  0.0408 
 11. Missing   --   --   --  --   --   --   --   --  0.2206  0.1523  -0.0305  0.0405 
Tax Rate   --   --   --  --  0.2046  0.2695  0.3155*  0.0723 0.2275  0.2697  0.3118*  0.0722 
Title  of  Interviewee                      
 2. Owner/proprietor  0.0121  0.0706   --  --  -0.0075  0.0808   --   --  0.0159  0.0792   --   -- 
 3. Partner   0.1629  0.1146      0.1923  0.1257   --   --  0.1700  0.1252     
 4. Director   0.0379  0.0750      0.0945  0.0808   --   --  0.0939  0.0809     
 5. General Manager   -0.1128  0.0953   --  --  -0.0219  0.1021   --   --  -0.0284  0.1023   --   -- 
 6. Manager   -0.0751  0.0920   --  --  -0.0095  0.0990   --   --  -0.0205  0.0992   --   -- 
 7. Finance Officer   0.1195  0.0831   --  --  0.1865*  0.0891   --   --  0.1778*  0.0894   --   -- 
Outside Auditor  0.1361*  0.0460   --  --  0.0813  0.0515   --   --  0.0775  0.0518   --   -- 
σ   --   --  0.4183*  0.0124  --   --  0.3637*  0.0090  --   --  0.3637*  0.0092 
ρ (1,2)   --   --  0.6348*  0.2382  --   --  -0.2435  03454   --   --  -0.2474  03495 
Observations  5,733   5,090    5,733   5,090    5,733   5,090   
 a Estimates in second and third panel include industry, size and country control variables. 
 * Significant at the 5 percent level, ** at 10 percent level. 
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Table 6A. Determinants of Tax Evasion: Country Effects (From Panels 2 and 3 in Table 6) 
  Participation Equation    Evasion Equation    Participation Equation    Evasion Equation   
Country Coefficient  s.e    Coefficient  s.e   Coefficient  s.e   Coefficient  s.e  
Albania 0.7914  0.2319  *  -0.1305  0.0565  *  0.7899  0.2325  *  -0.1183  0.0575  * 
Armenia  0.5823  0.1923  *  -0.3065  0.0549  *  0.5784  0.1918  *  -0.2925  0.0552  * 
Azerbaijan  0.2341  0.1734     -0.2901  0.0478  *  0.2378  0.1733     -0.2819  0.0481  * 
Belarus  1.0295  0.2351  *  -0.2975  0.0544  *  1.0163  0.2344  *  -0.2926  0.0546  * 
Bosnia   0.0047  0.1604     -0.0030  0.0409     -0.0069  0.1631     -0.0096  0.0417    
Bulgaria  -0.0097  0.1478     -0.1662  0.0424  *  0.0011  0.1477     -0.1709  0.0424  * 
Croatia -0.2138  0.1560      -0.1860  0.0503  *  -0.2761  0.1539  **  -0.2080  0.0507  * 
Czech Republic  0.2559  0.1537  **  -0.2254  0.0482  *  0.2353  0.1525     -0.2395  0.0483  * 
Estonia  -0.0628  0.1760     -0.2655  0.0575  *  -0.1025  0.1722     -0.2573  0.0568  * 
FYROM  1.0487  0.2116  *  0.1522  0.0558  *  1.0167  0.2105  *  0.1512  0.0559  * 
Georgia  0.9993  0.2716  *  0.0680  0.0573     0.9736  0.2714  *  0.0723  0.0578    
Hungary  0.1950  0.1521     -0.1604  0.0431  *  0.1333  0.1491     -0.1677  0.0428  * 
Kazakhstan  0.1253  0.1572     -0.2348  0.0423  *  0.0938  0.1567     -0.2285  0.0423  * 
Kyrgyz Rep.  -0.2070  0.1648     -0.1611  0.0442  *  -0.2268  0.1652     -0.1460  0.0444  * 
Latvia 0.3785  0.1866  *  -0.1783  0.0515  *  0.3143  0.1832  **  -0.1738  0.0508  * 
Lithuania  0.1887  0.1710     -0.1100  0.0452  *  0.1927  0.1687     -0.1271  0.0457  * 
Moldova 0.6408  0.2223  *  -0.1499  0.0531  *  0.6537  0.2205  *  -0.1527  0.0536  * 
Poland  0.5482  0.1399  *  -0.2291  0.0432  *  0.5347  0.1399  *  -0.2294  0.0440  * 
Romania 0.4152  0.1748  *  -0.1779  0.0484  *  0.4323  0.1657  *  -0.2048  0.0478  * 
Russia  0.0171  0.1373     -0.1924  0.0380  *  -0.0316  0.1341     -0.1954  0.0376  * 
Slovak Republic  -0.1689  0.1664     -0.1934  0.0533  *  -0.1642  0.1637     -0.2072  0.0525  * 
Slovenia  -0.2248  0.1576     -0.0562  0.0423     -0.2450  0.1575     -0.0557  0.0427    
Tajikistan  0.2320  0.1923     -0.1539  0.0484  *  0.2019  0.1926     -0.1475  0.0486  * 
Turkey  0.7401  0.1618  *  -0.1592  0.0486  *  0.7417  0.1596  *  -0.1726  0.0486  * 
Ukraine 0.3692  0.1484  *  -0.2882  0.0413  *  0.3610  0.1468  *  -0.2858  0.0414  * 
Uzbekistan  0.4513  0.1761  *  -0.3705  0.0466  *  0.4358  0.1763  *  -0.3555  0.0469  * 
Significant at the 5 percent level, ** at 10 percent level. 
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Table 7. Fraction of Sales Concealed by Possibility of Corrective Action without Bribes 
 Outcome  Mean  Std.  Dev.  n 
1 Never  Possible  0.202  0.265  976 
2  Seldom  0.199  0.253  1,175 
3 Sometimes  0.179  0.245  1,294 
4  Frequently  0.172  0.246  519 
5 Usually  0.135  0.216  508 
6  Always Possible  0.110  0.199  349 
7 Missing/No  Response  0.163  0.251  269 
  Total  0.177  0.247  5,090 
   Missing  --  --  643 
  Note: The seven indicators above are the responses to the survey question: 
 
How often is the following statement true? “If a government agent acts against 
the rules I can usually go to another official or to his superior and get the correct 
treatment without recourse to unofficial payments/gifts.” 
 
Table 8. Determinants of Tax Evasion a 
Tobit Tobit Tobit  IV  Variable  Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. 
Constant -0.0501  0.0489    0.0841  0.0500** -0.7034  0.1444* 
Gifts (Never =1 excluded)             
 2. Seldom   0.1996  0.0175** --  --  --  -- 
 3. Sometimes   0.2000  0.0180*  --  --  --  -- 
 4. Frequently   0.2667  0.0216*  --  --  --  -- 
 5. Usually   0.3149  0.0282*  --  --  --  -- 
 6. Always   0.2940  0.0317*  --  --  --  -- 
Gifts (linear)  --  --   0.0733  0.0046*   0.2668  0.0415* 
Organizational Form          
 2. Partnership  -0.0407  0.0168*  -0.0427  0.0169*  -0.0328  0.0199**
 3. Cooperative  -0.0058  0.0419  -0.0043  0.0420  0.0442  0.0499 
 4. Private corporation  -0.0488  0.0187*  -0.0490  0.0187*  -0.0394  0.0219**
 5. Listed corporation  -0.1494  0.0417*  -0.1513 0.0417*  -0.1276 0.0480* 
 6. Other  -0.0709  0.0370** -0.0672  0.0371** -0.0679  0.0435 
Tax Rate   0.3875  0.0793*   0.4018  0.0795**  0.3482  0.0921* 





-- --  -- --   16.53 
 [0.000]   
LL  -2586.1    -2589.4    -10692.7   
Observations  4,802   4,802   4,802  
Positive Observations  2,448    2,448    2,448   
a Estimates control for industry, size and country. 
b Bribes indicator is endogenous to evasion. 
* Significant at the 5 percent level, ** at 10 percent level.Reply to Comments on “Bribes and Business Tax Evasion” 